The international macroeconomic policy trilemma suggests that despite the appeal of exchange rate stability, financial account openness and monetary sovereignty, these cannot be achieved simultaneously. Using elements of Euclidean geometry, this paper proposes a new method for testing the trilemma and finds considerable evidence in support of it. Further tests indicate that, on average, policy configurations are not on the trilemma constraint, i.e. there is a degree of 'trilemmaineffectiveness', which is costly for real output growth and price inflation. It is shown that these costs can be attributed to limited exchange rate stability and financial account openness.
Introduction
There are several reasons why each aspect of the international macroeconomic trilemma-exchange rate stability, financial account openness and monetary sovereignty-may appeal to policymakers. Exchange rate stability prevents unnecessary resource shifts into and out of trade-oriented sectors that may result from exchange rate overshooting; it may be desirable as a nominal anchor for inflationary expectations; and, it protects a dollarised banking system from balance sheet shocks.
1 Financial openness should lead to an increase of investment inflows, which boosts output in the short-run.
2 It may also generate long-run benefits through a more efficient allocation of capital and by increasing the costs of policy mistakes and lack of reforms. 3 Monetary sovereignty allows for a more effective policy toolbox both for achieving internal balance and for responding to external shocks.
But, despite the attractiveness of each aspect of the trilemma, a policymaker cannot achieve all three simultaneously. For example, operating an open financial account and achieving perfect exchange rate stability necessarily implies the loss of monetary sovereignty. Any effort to change the monetary base (or, correspondingly, the interest rate) will lead to offsetting actions by the central bank in order to maintain the current level of the exchange rate. In the case of an expansion accompanied by a lower interest rate, the reduction in capital inflows will tend to weaken the domestic currency. In order to prevent the exchange rate (expressed here as the price of the foreign currency in local currency units) from appreciating, the central bank will have to absorb the extra liquidity it has generated by running down its international reserves.
So, in order to maintain a degree of monetary sovereignty, the country needs to implement restrictions in its financial account or sacrifice-to the required extent-the exchange rate stability objective.
4
This logic presumes that there are limits to the extent that the monetary authority can sterilise the foreign exchange market intervention by injecting liquidity in the banks' balance sheets. Sustaining a monetary expansion under fixed exchange rates with an open financial account would require a prolonged reserve haemorrhage, something which the policymaker cannot accept for too long.
5 Irrespective of the hoard, international reserves are an exhaustible resource and such policies cannot persist indefinitely. Ultimately, the trilemma should be a binding constraint.
In spite of the importance of the trilemma's implications for conducting macroeconomic policy, systematic efforts in assessing its empirical validity using large datasets are relatively recent. 6 This paper contributes to the related literature by offering a new way of testing the trilemma using elements of Euclidean geometry. The procedure is described, and, using data from the post-Bretton Woods era, implemented in section 2. In addition, the paper explores the macroeconomic consequences of failing to implement policies that maximise the extent to which the three aspects of the trilemma are met. This is done in section 4, following the introduction of the term 'trilemma effectiveness' in section 3. Section 5 concludes.
4 See Aizenman (2013) for more examples on the constraint the trilemma places on policymakers.
5 Quantitatively, the relationship between the change in the domestic component of the monetary base and the corresponding change in international reserves is captured by the offset coefficient. An early discussion of sterilisation and the offset coefficient can be found in Herring and Marston (1977) .
6 See, e.g., Shambaugh (2004) , Obstfeld et al. (2005) , Bleaney et al. (2013) and Aizenman et al. (2013) .
The Trilemma Constraint
Previous studies have investigated the trilemma constraint by gauging the responsiveness of the domestic interest rate to the foreign one (the latter is the interest rate of an appropriately selected 'base' country). The interest rate of a country implementing a fixed exchange rate regime with an open financial account will converge to-and fluctuate in tandem with-the foreign interest rate. If this is not the case, then there will be arbitrage opportunities. For example, a too-high domestic interest rate vis-à-vis the foreign interest rate will see an inflow of foreign capital exploiting the differential. This inflow, given perfect capital mobility, will result in higher asset prices and lower yields. The arbitrage activity will continue until the interest rate differential between the domestic and foreign assets, which are assumed to be perfect substitutes, is zero.
7
In other words, under these arrangements, a country is not expected to possess a meaningful degree of control over its monetary policy. Shambaugh (2004) and Obstfeld et al. (2005) find evidence that broadly support this expectation. Bleaney et al. (2013) find that pegs without capital controls are linked to a higher degree of monetary sovereignty than the constraints of the trilemma would suggest. Nevertheless, when they account for peg credibility issues, their results become more consistent with the trilemma.
8
A different approach, more closely related to the one pursued in this paper, is implemented by Aizenman et al. (2013) . Instead of concentrating on interest rate correlations, they include measures of exchange rate stability, financial 7 In reality, however, transaction costs may allow a financially open, exchange rate-fixing country some degree of monetary sovereignty. This is a point made by Obstfeld et al. (2005) .
8 Their argument is that in low-credibility pegs, devaluation expectations feed into the domestic interest rate disentangling it to some extent from the base country's rate and generating a false perception of relative monetary independence. account openness and monetary sovereignty in a regression framework. Their three goals are to determine whether the relationship among the three trilemma variables is a linear one, to obtain estimates of the tradeoffs between them and to test the trilemma itself. They find that the trilemma has been binding for industrialised countries since the early 1990s and for developing countries since the mid 2000s. Most important for the aims of this paper, their results suggest that the relationship between the trilemma variables is likely to be a linear one.
The presumption of linearity allows the depiction of the trilemma constraint as a triangle in the space defined by the three aspects of the trilemma. This is shown in Figure 1 as triangle ABC. At each point in time, the combination of exchange rate stability, financial account openness and monetary sovereignty determines each country's location in this three-dimensional space. In the context of this paper, each point represents a macroeconomic policy outcome (or configuration) . If the trilemma is binding, then the mean distance between the constraint and policy configurations exceeding the constraint, i.e. points that lie off the trilemma triangle in the opposite direction of the origin, will be statistically insignificant. This is the essence of the test proposed and implemented in this paper.
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The trilemma constraint is given by
where s stands for exchange rate stability (the abscissa in Figure 1 ), m stands for monetary sovereignty (the ordinate) and f stands for financial account openness (the height), and 0 ≤ s, m, f ≤ 1. Geometrically, the distance between a point and a plane is found by projecting a vector that connects the point of interest with a point on the plane onto the unit normal vector (i.e. a vector of length one, which is perpendicular to the plane). The length of a vector v connecting, e.g., a point P (s 1 , m 1 , f 1 ), which is off the plane, and, e.g., a point Q(s, m, f ), which lies on the plane, is
Given (1), the unit normal vector u is
The projection is just |v · u|. Hence, the distance, k, is
Substituting the trilemma constraint in (4) yields
Dropping the absolute value gives the 'signed' trilemma distance (henceforth, trilemma distance): a negative value means that the point in question lies somewhere between the origin and the trilemma plane, whereas a positive value means that the point lies off the plane in the opposite direction of the 9 More generally, it is a,b,c √ a 2 +b 2 +c 2 for a plane described by an equation ax + by + cz = d.
origin.

10
In order to calculate the distance between a configuration and the trilemma triangle, I use an updated version of the dataset from Aizenman et al. (2010) .
This features annual data on exchange rate stability, financial account openness and monetary sovereignty. The measure of the degree of exchange rate stability, s, is constructed using monthly observations of the exchange rate, e, vis-á-vis a base currency (most frequently but not always the US dollar). For country j in a given year, it is
with n j being the number of available monthly observations for country j in that year. The measure of the degree of monetary independence, m, is constructed using monthly observations of money market interest rates. For country j in a given year, it is
with i j being the interest rate of 'home' country j and i k being the interest rate of the 'base' country k. 11 The IMF's Annual Report of Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions is used to construct a de jure measure of capital account openness. This is calculated as the first principal component of variables representing controls on the current and capital accounts, the 10 There is, of course, no concept of negative distance: the sign solely identifies the direction.
11 Aizenman et al. (2010) make certain adjustments to these measures in order to deal with the tendency of s to overstate flexibility and of m to be 'noisy'. For more information see the notes on their paper available at http://web.pdx.edu/∼ito/trilemma indexes.htm.
presence of multiple exchange rates and the treatment of export proceeds.
12
Similarly to s and m, it is normalised to take values between zero and one.
The dataset consists of 5,289 usable observations-i.e. years between the period 1970 and 2012 for which the distance from the plane can be calculated. A more formal test of the trilemma involves testing the null hypothesis that the mean of the trilemma distance is zero against the alternative that it is positive. Inability to reject the null is interpreted as evidence that the constraint is binding, i.e. that the mean of the positive values observed are insignificant.
13
A natural candidate for this assessment is a Student's t-test. The latter is based on the classical assumptions about the distribution of observations, including the assumption of normality. Statistically, this is rejected for the trilemma distance variable.
14 However, the extent of similarity between the normal density and the variable's kernel density-both plotted along with a histogram in Figure 2 -is conducive to using the t-test. Results are reported in 12 For more details see Chinn and Ito (2006) . 13 Why these exist in the first place is an important question, but not one that is pursued here. One explanation could be that the degree of monetary sovereignty is actually exaggerated as it may reflect credibility issues rather than actual monetary independence. See Bleaney et al. (2013) for details.
14 Skewness is equal to 0.12 and the hypothesis that the difference with the degree of skewness of a normal distribution is zero cannot be rejected. Hence, on this criterion, normality cannot be rejected. However, one should reject the same hypothesis about kurtosis (equal to 2.5).
the last column of Table 1 for the entire sample, income groups, geographical regions and decades in the sample. In all cases, the null cannot be rejected.
15
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Introducing Trilemma Effectiveness
The numbers reported in Table 1 show that, on average, trilemma distance is negative. In this paper, this situation is defined as 'trilemma ineffectiveness'.
In contrast, an observation corresponds to a trilemma-effective configuration if the mean lies on the trilemma plane, i.e. if k = 0, or exceeds it. Statistical tests (not reported here but available from the author upon request) reject the hypothesis that the average trilemma distance is zero, in favour of the alternative that it is negative. The aim of this section is to probe the extent of trilemma ineffectiveness.
16
The numbers reported in Panel A of Table 1 show that low-income countries are, collectively, the most trilemma-ineffective. In other words, these countries could enjoy the benefits of a greater degree of financial account openness, exchange rate stability or monetary independence-or a combination of these-by implementing the relevant policies. Middle-income countries are more trilemma-effective, even though they are some way off the, historically, better performing high-income group.
15 Table A1 in the Appendix reports results for individual countries. Again, the null cannot be rejected in the majority of cases.
16 Explaining why observed policies are not closer to the trilemma constraint, i.e. identifying the reasons behind trilemma ineffectiveness, would be a natural extension of this work. One possible line of research would be to consider whether varying trilemma distances reflect varying levels of capital mobility. The latter may not necessarily coincide with the extent of financial openness because of, e.g., changes in investors' degree of risk-aversion. That could lead to a reduction of cross-country asset substitutability and, consequently, of capital mobility. This argument is offered by Globan (2014) does not guarantee a smooth inflow of investment from abroad. Calvo (1998) shows how capital may suddenly stop flowing into the domestic economy with deleterious effects. And, more recently, Rey (2013) has argued that the extent of financial integration in recent times has led to a 'global financial cycle'. As this tends to be unrelated to individual economies' macroeconomic conditions, it generates credit booms and busts. The implication is that irrespective of the exchange rate regime, an open capital account is equivalent to a loss of monetary independence. And this can lead to crises, if, for example, the global financial cycle leads to an 'extreme' credit expansion.
The link between trilemma effectiveness and inflation is more difficult to infer from the theory because in the small open economy framework of MundellFleming prices are sticky. Real world considerations, however, give rise to an expectation that, on balance, the two should move in opposite directions. The first consideration is exchange rate stability. In the long run, if purchasing power parity holds, a stable exchange rate can be seen as an indication of a credible anti-inflation monetary stance. Hence, it should be linked to lower inflation rates.
17 The second consideration is financial integration. The potential
link between an open financial account and prices is a priori quite uncertain.
If unemployment is low and the financial account leads to a higher inflow of direct investment, there could be upward pressure on wages and prices. Or, in different circumstances, the additional domestic production due to capital inflows could put downward pressure on product prices. Increased inward investment may also increase the value of the domestic currency making imports cheaper, and, hence, help reduce inflation. Available empirical evidence are consistent with the argument that financial integration should be linked to lower inflation rates, e.g. Wei and Tytell (2004 This very brief discussion has touched upon the issues surrounding international macroeconomic policy, the latter being defined as the combination of exchange rate stability, financial account openness and monetary independence. Depending on preferences, a policymaker may want to pursue one particular policy at the expense of another, but, overall, and in the long-run, they will want to adopt a configuration that places the economy on the trilemma constraint. For example, if a policymaker values exchange rate stability but would like to manage the financial account, then she would expect to get at least some degree of monetary sovereignty.
Data and methodology
The degree of trilemma effectiveness is captured by the trilemma distance variable.
18 Recall that it is a 'signed' distance in that a negative value shows that the trilemma constraint has not been violated and a positive sign shows that it has.
19 Values corresponding to points closer to the constraint, on it, or exceeding it are preferred to points that lie away from the constraint and towards the origin, as they correspond to more favourable combinations of the three aspects of the trilemma.
The functional forms of the estimated growth and inflation equations are 18 The configuration is observed but is not 'actual' due to the de jure nature of financial account openness. This point is discussed further in the conclusions.
19 The analysis in the previous section has shown that, collectively, the hypothesis of a positive mean trilemma distance is rejected. similar to Husain et al. (2005) , augmented with the trilemma effectiveness measure. Descriptive statistics for all variables are presented in Table 2 . The dependent variable in the growth equation is the natural log change per annum of GDP per capita in 2005 international dollars (using PPP rates).
20 In explaining growth, factor accumulation is captured via the inclusion of investment (gross fixed capital formation divided by GDP) and population-both in level (natural log) and as a growth rate (change in natural log). 21 The government sector is captured by the budget balance (as a share of GDP) and tax revenue (again as a share of GDP). In addition, imports plus exports (percent of GDP) and terms of trade (change in the natural log of net barter terms of trade) are also included. The source for all variables is the World Bank's World Development Indicators, unless otherwise stated.
21 Data for the mean years of schooling for over-25s (source: UNESCO) were collected in order to capture the effect of human capital on economic growth. However, the number of observations is too small to include this variable in the specification.
22 To capture output convergence, each country's real output per capita was divided by US's real output per capita in 1980 (the first year for which US data are available for this variable). It turns out that the estimated coefficient of this variable is insignificant in all estimations and does not affect the estimates of trilemma distance. Hence, it is not included in the model.
23 Data for the latter are from Dreher et al. (2010) .
nal shocks that affect all countries (e.g. a US monetary policy shock). The resulting specification, where both country and time dummies are included, captures the relationship between trilemma effectiveness and macroeconomic performance within countries.
The decision to model effects as fixed rather than treat them as random was based on the results from a test by Schaffer and Stillman (2006 25 For more details on cluster-robust errors see Nichols and Schaffer (2007) .
the elasticity of international capital flows with respect to changes in domestic interest rates.
A different measurement bias, however, pushes in the opposite direction. 27 See Steiner (2013) for an empirical assessment of the extent to which international reserves are built up as a substitute for capital controls. Table 4 reports results for the inflation equation. The estimates of trilemma effectiveness in the baseline equations are, as expected, negative and statistically significant. Even as part of a richer specification (the augmented models) this remains the case and, along with money growth and real output growth, trilemma effectiveness is a significant determinant of inflation in the sample.
Main Results
The dynamic specification results are slightly more ambiguous, as the inclusion of year dummies removes the significance from the trilemma effectiveness coefficient. But, the overall picture that emerges from these models is difficult to blur: trilemma ineffectiveness goes hand-in-hand with higher inflation rates.
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28 The estimations were repeated sequentially treating investment as a predetermined or endogenous variable. The thrust of the results remained unaffected.
29 Allowing money growth to be predetermined or endogenous does not change the results materially.
Additional Results: Breaking down the trilemma
These results warrant further exploration. If trilemma ineffectiveness is associated with macroeconomic costs, is it possible to identify the precise aspect of the trilemma that underlies this link? In order to answer this question, the relative importance of the distance between policy configurations and the trilemma triangle's vertices (A, B and C in Figure 1 ) needs to be quantified.
More specifically, each vertex corresponds to a combination of the maximum possible value for two of the trilemma policy objectives and zero for the other. 
where x = (A, B, C) and s,m,f is (1, 0, 1) for vertex A, (0, 1, 1) for vertex B, and (1, 1, 0) for vertex C; subscript it indexes a country i and year t observation; s, m and f stand for exchange rate stability, monetary sovereignty and financial account openness, as before.
The results under Specification I column of Table 5 Table 5 and confirm the earlier findings.
The link between 'above average' exchange rate stability and economic growth is confirmed. In addition, exchange rate stability is also linked to inflation, even though its estimated coefficient is approximately half the size of the coefficient of financial openness.
Conclusions
The international macroeconomic policy trilemma is now more than half a century old (Mundell, 1963) . It has profound implications for open macroeconomic policy, as it sets out clear constraints within which the latter has to operate. Under perfect capital mobility, and assuming asset substitutability, the prevalence of the trilemma is guaranteed by the no-arbitrage condition.
But if markets are imperfect, there is scope to examine whether countries' policies are really bound by it.
There have been few such tests in the literature and most of these have appeared in the last decade. This paper proposes a new method for testing the trilemma based on Euclidean geometry. The appeal of this approach is that it is straightforward to implement and easy to visualise. Using annual data between 1970 and 2012 on exchange rate stability, financial account openness and monetary independence for 123 countries, the tests support the policy 31 So, exchange rate stability is calculated as
, and so on. Notes. Trilemma effectiveness is defined as the signed distance from the trilemma constraint -see text for more details; Convergence is real output per capita divided by the US real output per capita in 1980; Schooling measures the mean years of schooling for over-25s (source: UNESCO); CB Governor time in office is measured in years. 907 (103) 907 (103) 791 ( 1044 (100) 1044 (100) 929 (100) Note: Dependent variable: Percent change per annum of consumer price index. Variables Budget, Tax, Terms of Trade and Population (growth) are 3-year backward averages. Country effects (i) as well as country and time effects (i and t) are included. ρ measures how much of the estimated variance of the overall error is accounted for by the effects. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and within-panel (serial) correlation for the static models and to cross-sectional heteroscedasticity only for the dynamic models. 
A Appendix
